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ABSTRACT
The main trends underlying advancements in AI technology are increased autonomy, 
increased functionality, higher level social interaction and integration, and, many suggest, 
hard-wired ethical codes of conduct. These trends, along with the promises of engineers 
and scientists, give us ample reason to evaluate the agency of future AI machines.
iii
INTRODUCTION
 The formally  unimaginable world in which planes and cars steer themselves, 
surgeries are performed by machines, and babies learn about social interaction by 
observing robots, has become our reality. Researchers at Google have built a fully 
automatic car that has clocked in over 1,000 miles on the road without human 
intervention, and one even drove itself down Lombard Street in San Francisco.1  McGill 
University  Health Center in Canada recently  hosted the world’s first automated 
anesthesia and robotic surgery.2  Unsurprisingly, people’s attitudes toward their 
mechanical helpers seem to be changing as well. Researchers at the University  of 
Washington just published a study concluding that  babies are more likely to treat social 
robots as sentient beings than inanimate objects. 3 Emerging technology offers even more 
sophistication and autonomy in artificially intelligent agents. NASA, for example, hopes 
to send a robot to the moon within three years; its forerunner has already been sent into 
1
1 Sebastian Thrun, "What We’re Driving at," The Official Google Blog, October 9, 2010, http://
googleblog.blogspot.com/2010/10/what-were-driving-at.html (accessed November 2, 2010).
2 Emma Woollacott, "First All-robotic Surgery and Anesthesia Performed," TG Daily, October 20, 2010, 
http://www.tgdaily.com/general-sciences-features/52099-first-all-robotic-surgery-and-anesthesia-performed 
(accessed November 2, 2010).
3 Molly McElroy, "I Want to See What You See: Babies Treat 'social Robots' as Sentient Beings," 
University of Washington News, October 14, 2010, http://uwnews.org/article.asp?articleID=60848 
(accessed November 2, 2010).
orbit to help maintain the space station.4  Armed, autonomous, robotic soldiers that can 
distinguish between comrades and enemies are already in development.5  Autism 
researchers see a bright future in humanoid therapists helping autistic patients forge 
stronger social bonds.6 The extensive competency  of present and future AI agents ensures 
that we will rely heavily on their functionalities and come to expect a certain level of 
productive output from them.
 Interestingly, the notion of machine intelligence emerged as a result of research 
about the nature of human intelligence. Norbert Wiener’s notable studies about feedback 
loops led him to theorize that intelligent behavior in humans resulted from feedback loop 
mechanisms, and that machines could potentially  simulate these mechanisms.7  Wiener’s 
research had a strong influence on the early development of AI and inspired people to 
reevaluate their conceptions of  human intelligence. The idea that human intelligence 
itself consists mostly, if not entirely, of computational processes has captured the interest 
of engineers who seek to stretch the boundaries of current technology  and blur the lines 
between human and machine intelligence. This computational model provides a scientific 
paradigm that effectively connects neuroscience and psychology  with AI. It seems that 
we have a pervasive urge to recreate ourselves.
2
4 Kenneth Chang, "NASA’s Quest to Send a Robot to the Moon," The New York Times, November 2, 2010, 
Science section, New York edition, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/02/science/space/02robot.html 
(accessed November 5, 2010).
5 Jason Palmer, "Call for Debate on Killer Robots," BBC News, August 3, 2009, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/
technology/8182003.stm (accessed November 5, 2010).
6 Gregory Mone, "The New Face of Autism Therapy," Popular Science, June 1, 2010, http://
www.popsci.com/science/article/2010-05/humanoid-robots-are-new-therapists (accessed November 5, 
2010).
7 Norbert Wiener, Cybernetics or Control and Communication in the Animal and the Machine, 2nd ed. 
(Cambridge: MIT Press, 1965).
 Today, artificially intelligent agents reside outside of our moral realm due to their 
limited capabilities, but as machines become more sophisticated and autonomous, we 
must decide how we should think about the question of what we owe our machines. 
Given that there will be machines that can pass the Turing Test, what conditions are 
required in order for these agents to be part of a moral community?
 My goal is to establish some ethical framework for how we should approach the 
question of what moral privileges we owe our machines. In chapter one, I offer a 
description of the Turing Test, explain what it tests, and discuss its relationship with what 
is required for an agent to receive consideration for moral status.  I summarize and refute 
the most significant objections to the Church-Turing thesis. In chapter two, I engage in a 
deeper exploration of the concept of moral agency and begin to frame the question of 
what we owe our AI machines.
3
CHAPTER ONE
I. THE TURING TEST
 Six decades ago, when the Information Age was in its infancy, Alan Turing dared 
to approach the question, "Can computers think?" But it was not  long before he realized 
that this question was riddled with philosophical ambiguities. Even our notion of what it 
is to "think" remains a topic of debate. In his 1950 paper, Computing Machinery and 
Intelligence, Turing introduces what he calls the "Imitation Game" and proposes a new 
set of questions to replace our original, "Can computers think?"
 The imitation game involves three players: one human interrogator, one human 
player, and one machine player. The interrogator asks the players questions through an 
input terminal in order to determine which player is human and which is machine. Both 
players try to act in a way  such that the interrogator perceives him (or it) to be human. A 
machine has effectively  "passed" the Turing Test if the interrogator cannot reliably tell 
the machine from the human. Turing therefore proposes that we replace the question, 
"Can computers think," with the question, "Are there imaginable digital computers which 
would do well in the imitation game?"1
 Turing narrows down the list  of eligible machine participants by specifying that 
the machine player must be a “digital computer.” A toaster, for example, would not be 
4
1 Alan M. Turing, "Computing Machinery and Intelligence," Mind 59, No. 236 (1950): 433-60, doi:
10.1093/mind/LIX.236.433 (accessed September 30, 2010).
eligible to participate in the Turing Test, because it is not a digital computer; it is merely 
an appliance.2  Digital computers, Turing explains, “are intended to carry out any 
operations which could be done by a human computer.”3  The “human computer” is the 
way he refers to the human capacity for thought (or more vaguely, the “mind”). He notes, 
“The human computer is supposed to be following fixed rules; he has no authority to 
deviate from them in any  detail. We may suppose that these rules are supplied in a book, 
which is altered whenever he is put on to a new job. He has also an unlimited supply of 
paper on which he does his calculations.”4  From this point, Turing maps out how the 
functions and parts of a digital computer correspond to those of a human computer. A 
digital computer, he claims, can be regarded as consisting of three parts:5
(i) Store.
(ii) Executive unit.
(iii) Control.
The digital computer’s store corresponds to the human computer’s calculation scrap 
paper, rule book, and memory (for example, when the scrap  paper is not needed to 
perform the calculation). The digital computer’s executive unit is the part that performs 
the calculation step-by-step, much like how the human computer performs the 
calculation. The individual operations in each step will differ greatly from machine to 
5
2 I do not doubt that there will be highly sophisticated toasters in the future, but in this example, I am 
referring to the typical, present-day, household toaster oven.
3 Turing, “Computing Machinery and Intelligence,” 436.
4 Ibid.
5 Ibid., 437.
machine, just as some human computers are more mathematically  inclined than other 
human computers. Lastly, the role of the digital computer’s control is to make sure that 
the rules in the rule book (stored in its program memory) are obeyed.
 Turing’s detailed outline of these correspondences show that  not only have digital 
computers been modeled after human computers, but they can also “mimic the actions of 
a human computer very closely.”6  Furthermore, the process by which a digital computer 
is programmed to perform a certain task is similar to how a human computer learns to 
carry  out a new operation. Learning in humans consists largely of reinforcing specific 
patterns of behavior and discouraging others, both purely mechanical processes.
 The thrust of Turing’s essay is against the exceptionalism concerning the human 
capacity for thought that was pervasive in his day, and especially  evident in the 
objections to his thesis. His goal is not to identify whatever the sine qua non of the 
human mind is and attempt to ascertain whether a computer can emulate it. Instead, he 
calls into question our own assumptions about what “intelligence” is.
 What makes the Turing Test  so brilliant is that it black-boxes the entire discussion 
about the nature of human intelligence. Whatever that intelligence is or however it works, 
if another human being communicates with an AI machine and cannot tell the difference 
between it and an actual human, then for all intent and purposes, Turing argues, it  is 
exhibiting “human”-type intelligence. In order for a machine to conceivably pass the 
Turing Test, it must implement problem-solving and linguistic skills, as well as inductive 
and deductive reasoning, not to mention substantial background and contextual 
6
6 Ibid., 438.
knowledge. Turing is not concerned with the definitions of consciousness or spontaneity 
and how they relate to human intelligence. He believes that these are misleading lines of 
argument because they  try to draw attention to the differences in the way  the intelligence 
is packaged rather than address anything meaningful about its underlying nature.
 In 1950, Turing predicted that by the turn of the millennium, “it will be possible 
to program computers with a storage capacity  of about 109, to make them play  the 
imitation game so well that the average interrogator will not have more than a 70 percent 
chance of making the right identification after five minutes of questioning.”7  Today, the 
average laptop computer has a storage capacity  of about 1010 machine words, and many 
desktop computers have 1011 (a terabyte). But despite Turing’s underestimation of our 
developments in storage capacity, we have not yet engineered a machine that stands a 
chance of passing the Turing Test.
II. OBJECTIONS TO TURING’S THESIS
 In his paper, Turing preemptively  refutes nine objections to the notion that 
machines can think.The most significant of these in terms of ethics are “The Argument 
for Consciousness” and “Lady  Lovelace’s Objection.” I summarize both of these 
objections and explain why they fail to undermine the validity of Turing’s thesis. In 
7
7 Ibid., 442.
addition, I describe John Searle’s well-known “Chinese Room Argument,” which I rebut 
more thoroughly in the next chapter.
Lady Lovelace’s Objection
 Lady  Lovelace’s objection is that analytical engines (the largely theoretical 
mechanical computers of her own time, a century before Turing) do not have the ability 
to originate ideas (unlike humans, who can generate original thoughts and ideas). Turing 
cites a quotation from her memoir: “‘The Analytical Engine has no pretensions to 
originate anything. It can do whatever we know how to order it to perform’ (her italics).”8 
Turing says, in agreement withDouglas Hartree’s position in Calculating Instruments and 
Machines (1949), that perhaps the machines to which Lady Lovelace had access did not 
display  this ability, but that observation has no bearing on the possibility for future 
machines to have the ability to originate anything:
It will be noticed that [Hartree] does not assert that the machines in 
question had not got the property, but rather that  the evidence available to 
Lady  Lovelace did not encourage her to believe that they had it. It is quite 
possible that the machines in question had in a sense got this property. For 
suppose that some discrete-state machine has the property. The Analytical 
Engine was a universal digital computer, so that, if its storage capacity  and 
speed were adequate, it could by suitable programming be made to mimic 
the machine in question.9
 Her objection, however, does raise important questions about originality  and the 
concept of learning. Turing entertains the thought that originality could be a 
misconception, and what we consider to be “original work” could just be the result of 
8
8 Ibid., 450.
9 Ibid.
following and applying principles that we have been taught. He wonders, “Who can be 
certain that ‘original work’ that he has done was not simply the growth of the seed 
planted in him by teaching, or the effect of following well-known general principles?”10 
This thought is a subset of the notion that we do not create new things, but  rather we 
discover them.11 Turing explains that if this notion is true, then perhaps a better variant  of 
Lady  Lovelace’s objection is that a machine can never be spontaneous or “take us by 
surprise.” The reasoning behind this objection is that if we are diligent in our calculations 
of a machine’s expected output given a known input, then the actual output will always 
be the expected output and nothing else. Only  a miscalculation on the part of the human 
will lead to “surprising” output from the machine, but the machine of course cannot 
receive credit in this case because the output is a result of human miscalculation rather 
than the machine itself. Turing replies that the view that machines cannot give rise to 
surprises is due to unfounded assumptions about the way in which machines are 
constrained by their hardware and software versus the way  in which humans are 
constrained by biology and physiology. Those who accept this variant of Lady Lovelace’s 
objection generally  assume that constraints on machines prohibit spontaneity whereas 
constraints on humans do not. But if the behavior of an artificially intelligent machine is 
deterministic, why would human behavior be any different? It is very possible that human 
behavior is deterministic as well, for it is unclear that the ways in which we think and 
9
10 Ibid.
11 The “discovery" principle goes back to Plato’s philosophical treatise Meno, where the philosopher 
purports to show that learning is not a creation of something new but rather a remembrance of something 
old.
learn are different from simply running a program. Perhaps in human to human 
interaction, the instances in which we believe we have been taken by  surprise are indeed 
just instances of miscalculation on our part, and like the machine, the other human cannot 
receive credit for the “surprising” output.
The Consciousness Objection
 The consciousness objection is that machines cannot think because they  cannot 
feel emotions or perceive sensory input as being pleasurable or painful.12  It denies the 
validity  of the imitation game by  appealing to the view that consciousness equates with 
qualia (feeling states) rather than cognitive processes. Turing admits that there is a sort  of 
mystery  about consciousness, but the mysteriousness is not exclusive to the 
consciousness of machines. He reminds us of the classic mind-body problem that arises 
from the “consciousness as qualia” viewpoint, which is that the only  way one can be 
certain that another person thinks is to be that person and experience oneself thinking:
According to the most extreme form of this view the only  way by  which 
one could be sure that machine thinks is to be the machine and to feel 
oneself thinking. One could then describe these feelings to the world, but 
of course no one would be justified in taking any notice. Likewise 
according to this view the only way to know that a man thinks is to be that 
particular man.13
Therefore, those who accept the consciousness objection are either solipsistic, or simply 
making an unfounded assumption that humans can feel but machines cannot. In regards 
to the latter, it is not uncommon for humans to not  know with whom they are 
10
12 Ibid, 445.
13 Ibid, 446.
communicating over the Internet. This occurs most often in chat rooms, forums, and 
comments sections. In most cases, we assume that we are talking to other humans, 
despite the fact that  many  of us are aware of the possibility that we could be talking to 
computer generated responses.14  Several websites implement chatterbots to assist users, 
and they are often programmed to speak like humans to give the illusion that a human 
behind the computer is dedicated to helping users with their problems. Even ELIZA, the 
“computer therapist” who first appeared in the 1960s, was frequently mistaken for a 
human, despite the limited technological resources available to her programmer, Joseph 
Weizenbaum.15
 Oftentimes, we are willing and prepared to “accept our invisible interlocutor as a 
(normal, ordinary) human with human thinking capacities.”16  If those who accept the 
consciousness argument believe that some being is human, they would also find it 
justifiable to believe that the being has human thinking capabilities. But if they  realize 
that they are mistaken, and that  the being is actually a machine, they would immediately 
change their minds about the justifiability of their belief in the being’s human thinking 
capabilities. Turing finds it rather naïve to base one’s view of whether or not a belief is 
justifiable on a factor that is so dependent on assumption, and that one’s beliefs must shift 
11
14 For example, receiving emails, text messages, and instant messages consisting of computer-generated 
spam that masquerades as human-generated content in order to gain the trust of readers is extremely 
common. Unfortunately, many people are tricked into downloading harmful viruses or giving away their 
credit card information as a result of this spam.
15 Joseph Weizenbaum, "ELIZA--A Computer Program For the Study of Natural Language Communication 
Between Man and Machine," Communications of the ACM 9, No. 1 (1966): 36, http://web.archive.org/web/
20071026055950/http://www.fas.harvard.edu/~lib51/files/classics-eliza1966.html (accessed November 24, 
2010).
16 William J. Rapaport, “How to Pass a Turing test,” Journal of Logic, Language and Information 9 (2000):
469.
in accordance with the truth of that assumption. Moreover, it seems ignorant  to doubt a 
being’s cognitive capabilities solely based on the being’s provenance (biological versus 
mechanical).
The Chinese Room Argument
 Turing’s dismissal of this objection is problematic, since he does not address the 
deeper issue, namely that his imitation game is not a test of intelligence, but rather a test 
of the ability to simulate intelligent behavior. This concern is more clearly  delineated in 
John Searle’s “Chinese Room” argument, which addresses the nature of human 
intelligence head-on. Searle argues that behavioral properties of intelligence alone are not 
sufficient grounds for determining whether or not an agent is intelligent, and likens the 
distinction between machine intelligence and human intelligence to that of syntax and 
semantics. His goal is to prove that passing the Turing Test does not adequately indicate 
intelligence, and he draws a distinction between what he calls “strong AI” and “weak AI.” 
In cases of strong AI, Searle explains, “the computer is not  merely a tool in the study of 
the mind; rather, the appropriately programmed computer really  is a mind, in the sense 
that computers given the right programs can be literally said to understand and have other 
cognitive states.”17  On the other hand, in cases of weak AI, the computer merely 
simulates thought and cannot be said to truly  understand or have cognitive states. He 
explains, “According to weak AI, the principal value of the computer in the study of the 
mind is that it  gives us a very  powerful tool. For example, it enables us to formulate and 
12
17 John R. Searle, “Minds, brains and programs,” Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (1980): 417-57, doi:
10.1017/S0140525X00005756 (accessed September 30, 2010).
test hypotheses in a more rigorous and precise fashion.”18  In Searle’s view, the Turing 
Test attempts to test for intelligence in accordance with strong AI, but  it inevitably fails 
and instead achieves accordance with weak AI.
 Searle’s Minds, Brains, and Programs (1980) introduces the “Chinese Room” 
thought experiment to present his objection Turing’s thesis and disprove the strong AI 
hypothesis. He asks the reader to imagine that she is “locked in a room, and given a large 
batch of Chinese writing” plus a “second batch of Chinese script together with a set of 
rules for correlating the second batch with the first batch.” The rules are in English, and 
enable the reader to “correlate one set of formal symbols with another set of formal 
symbols”.19  He uses the word ‘formal’ to mean that the reader “can identify the symbols 
entirely  by their shapes.” The reader is then given a third batch of Chinese symbols and 
another set of instructions that allow her “to correlate elements of this third batch with 
elements of the first two batches,” and her final task is “to give back certain sorts of 
Chinese symbols with certain sorts of shapes in response.” Searle adds, that unbeknownst 
to the reader, the first batch is called “a script” by those who give it to her. Likewise, the 
second batch is called “a story,” the third is called “questions,” and the set of rules is 
called “the program.” These names, however, have no bearing on how the reader 
performs the task. He then asks the reader to imagine that she has become so adept at 
following the instructions and performing the task, that “from the point  of view of 
somebody outside the room,” her responses to the third batch of Chinese symbols are 
13
18 Ibid.
19 Ibid.
“absolutely  indistinguishable from [answers to the questions] of native Chinese 
speakers.”20  Even though she speaks and understands no Chinese and she has no idea that 
the third batch of Chinese symbols are questions or that her responses are answers to 
these questions, people consistently believe that the reader is a native Chinese speaker 
based on her responses. Now suppose that  the above process is repeated, except with 
English writing instead of Chinese. Again, the reader follows the instructions and 
performs the task so well that her responses are naturally  “indistinguishable from those of 
other native English speakers” (which makes sense, because she is a native English 
speaker). Searle points out that from a third-party perspective, the reader’s answers to the 
Chinese questions and her English questions are “equally good.” But the processes by 
which she formulates her responses in the Chinese case are fundamentally  different from 
those in the English case. Specifically, in the Chinese case, she “produces the answers by 
manipulating uninterpreted formal symbols,” whereas in the English case, she 
understands that she is receiving questions and giving answers, and the symbols have 
semantic meaning that has little to do with their shapes. Searle argues that in the Chinese 
case, the reader “simply behave[s] like a computer” since all she does is “perform 
computational operations on formally specified elements.” She is essentially an 
“instantiation of the computer program.”21  She receives input that is meaningless to her 
and produces output likewise.
14
20 Ibid.
21 Ibid.
 In Searle’s view, a native Chinese speaker understands Chinese. The reader, 
however, alone in the “Chinese Room,” does not, because her mere instantiation of the 
computer program is not a sufficient condition for intentionality.22  Yet she has fooled 
everyone into believing that she is fluent in Chinese. Searle believes that this is precisely 
what occurs when a machine passes the Turing Test. Like the reader, the machine fools 
the interrogator with its presumed natural language aptitude, but in reality, the machine 
does not understand what it  is saying or what is being said to it. Therefore, Searle claims, 
it is possible for an entity to pass the Turing Test without being able to think, and the 
strong AI hypothesis fails.
III. REPLIES TO THE CHINESE ROOM ARGUMENT
 There are several responses to Searle’s argument that seek to reinforce the validity 
of Turing’s thesis. In this chapter, I analyze the most popular replies, namely, the Systems 
Reply  and the Robot Reply, as well as the Reply to Searle’s Argument from Semantics 
and the Reply to Searle’s Notion of Intentionality.
The Systems Reply
 The most common response to Searle’s Chinese Room argument is known as the 
Systems Reply, which says that it is true that the reader, alone in the Chinese Room, does 
15
22 Ibid.
not understand Chinese, but that is because she is just a part of a larger system, and that 
larger system could indeed understand Chinese.23  The larger system includes the reader, 
the set of instructions, and the scrap paper (memory) she uses to help aid the process of 
responding. She plays the role of the central processing unit (CPU), or, as Turing calls it 
in his essay, the executive unit. All parts of the system are required in order for it to 
understand Chinese.
 Searle frames his description of the Systems Reply such that  it “simply begs the 
question by  insisting without argument that the system must understand Chinese.”24 
However, the Systems Reply should be understood as an attack on Searle’s logic. It 
subtly proves that  his argument against the possibility of the system understanding 
Chinese is not logically valid. The proposition that the reader’s formal symbol 
manipulation does not enable the reader to understand Chinese does not entail the 
proposition that the reader’s formal symbol manipulation does not enable the Chinese 
Room as a whole to understand Chinese.25
 This reply proves to be quite problematic for Searle’s argument. Clearly, the 
reader would not  be able to convince anybody that  she were a native Chinese speaker if 
she lacked the comprehensive set of instructions in English. It is the combination of the 
reader plus the instructions that fools everybody, not the reader alone. The instructions 
are paramount to the system’s success in appropriately responding to specific questions in 
16
23 Ibid.
24 Ibid.
25 Jack B. Copeland, "The chinese room from a logical point of view," in Views Into the Chinese Room: 
New Essays on Searle and Artificial Intelligence, ed. John M. Preston and Michael A. Bishop (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2003), 110.
Chinese. However, in the conclusion of his thought experiment, Searle regards the reader 
as the sole entity participating in the Turing Test. He then fails to see how that would be 
similar to a machine’s CPU taking the Turing Test without that machine’s memory store 
or instruction set. A CPU alone does not qualify as a digital computer, and therefore, 
Searle has not  proved that an entity could conceivably pass the Turing Test without being 
able to think, and Turing’s thesis stands. 
 Searle’s response to the Systems Reply is that a man could theoretically memorize 
the entire instruction manual and do all of the calculations in his head, thus internalizing 
the entire Chinese-understanding system, but the formal symbols would still have no 
meaning to him. He could be the system without understanding a word of Chinese.26
 This counterargument is most eloquently shot down by Jack Copeland in his 
paper, The Chinese Room from a Logical Point of View. Copeland argues that  the man 
who internalizes the system is still just the CPU, or the implementor, despite the fact that 
the internalized system does fully understand Chinese. He likens this to the mechanisms 
in the brain that solve equations in a manner so precise that they  enable us “to catch 
cricket balls and other moving objects,” yet we do not understand how or why these 
equations work.27
 The Systems Reply is but one response to Searle’s argument that seeks to preserve 
the validity  of the Turing Test as an indicator for intelligence, and it succeeds by 
17
26 Searle, “Minds, brains and programs.”
27 Copeland, "The chinese room from a logical point of view," 112.
uncovering a level-of-description fallacy in Searle’s claims. Other replies reveal further 
fallacies in the Chinese Room argument, and reinforce the message of Turing’s thesis.
The Robot Reply
 This reply  arises from the view that  the person in the Chinese Room is prevented 
from understanding Chinese by a lack of sensorimotor connection with the reality that the 
Chinese characters represent. If the system were housed inside a robot that has sensory-
motor capabilities, it would be able to “perceive” and “act,” and thus, genuinely 
understand Chinese, since semantic value of information is heavily dependent on context.
 Searle notes that the Robot Reply “tacitly concedes that cognition is not solely a 
matter of formal symbol manipulation, since this reply adds a set of causal relation with 
the outside world.”28  Like Searle’s Chinese Room argument, the Robot Reply is an 
argument from semantics and emphasizes the role of understanding through perceiving 
and acting. The Robot Reply, therefore, cannot possibly defend Turing’s thesis against 
Searle’s objection, because it  is vulnerable to an infinite recursion. As Searle explains, 
“Notice that the same thought experiment applies to the robot case. Suppose that instead 
of the computer inside the robot, you put  me inside the room and, as in the original 
Chinese case...”29 The Robot Reply is ineffective, but it remains popular.
 Below, I will discuss why arguments from semantics fail to threaten Turing’s 
thesis.
18
28 Searle, “Minds, brains and programs.”
29 Ibid.
Reply to Searle’s Argument from Semantics
 Searle’s Chinese Room argument focuses on semantic meaning as a necessary 
condition of cognition and understanding. He later formalizes this argument as follows:
 (Axiom 1) Computer programs are formal (syntactic).
 (Axiom 2) Human minds have mental contents (semantics).
 (Axiom 3) Syntax by itself is neither constitutive of nor sufficient for semantics.
 (Conclusion) Programs are neither constitutive of nor sufficient for minds.30
There are several ways in which one can unpack this argument to uncover its flaws. 
William Rapaport’s approach, which he delineates wonderfully in his essay, How to Pass 
a Turing Test, is to claim that premise (S3) is wrong, and that syntax is sufficient for 
semantics. He explains that “what Searle alleges is missing from the Chinese Room is 
semantic links to the external world,” for example, the link from some shape or squiggle 
referring to some meaningful thing, such as a hamburger (an example chosen by 
Rapaport).31
 Rapaport points out that Searle makes two assumptions: that external links are 
necessary  in order for the system to “attach” meaning to the appropriate symbols, and 
that computers have no means of linking to the external world; they only have access to 
what is internal to them.32  First, if external links were necessary, it seems very well 
possible that computers could have them. This is the main point of the Robot Reply, as 
19
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31 Rapaport, “How to Pass a Turing test,” 474.
32 Ibid.
previously  discussed. To review, the idea of the Robot Reply  is that  housing the Chinese 
Room inside of a robot “body” would give the system sensorimotor capabilities, which 
would allow the system to process information contextually rather than reflexively or 
mechanically. But, Rapaport asks, are these sensorimotor links necessary? He claims that 
they  are not, and his argument is quite clever. He seeks to prove that insofar as the 
syntactic symbols are internal to a mind, the “semantic domain can be internalized.”33
 He recalls how we learn the meanings of words in the first place:
How do I learn that ‘tree’ refers to that large brown-and-green thing I see 
before me? Someone points to it in my  presence and says something like 
“This is called a ‘tree’.” Perhaps numerous repetitions of this, with 
different trees, are needed. I begin to associate two things, but what two 
things? A tree and the word ‘tree’? No; to paraphrase Percy  (1975: 43), the 
tree is not the tree out  there, and the word ‘tree’ is not the sound in the air. 
Rather, my internal representation of the word becomes associated 
(“linked,” or “bound”) with my internal representation of the tree.34 
When the reader imagines herself in the Chinese Room, it is likely  that she sees a 
particular symbol more than once. She could, in fact, see a particular symbol many times, 
to the point where she remembers what it looks like when she comes across it and she 
remembers how to respond. Conceivably, she could remember numerous symbols in the 
same way, such that  she would no longer need to look up how to respond. In a sense, she 
is actually  internalizing the corresponding semantic domain for a given symbol, and 
learning Chinese. The syntactical symbols “should not be thought of as symbols 
representing something external to the system; although they  can be related to other 
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things by a third person, the only relations needed by the cognitive agent are all 
internal.”35
 I think that Rapaport is absolutely  correct here, and his argument reminds me of 
the famous philosophical conundrum about the bent stick in the water. We believe that we 
genuinely see things, not mere illusions or mental images of them. This belief, however, 
becomes seriously problematic when we consider the bent  stick in the water. When part 
of a stick is submerged in clear water, it  undeniably appears bent, but when we remove 
the stick from the water completely, it becomes obvious that the stick is straight. If we 
believe that we see things as they really  are, we must also believe that the fundamental 
nature of the stick changes sometime between its submerged-state and its removed-state. 
She must also concede that the stick itself has causal powers that result in our seeing it 
differently in water versus in air. In contrast, if one believes that all we see are mental 
images, the bent stick example makes perfect  sense. When the stick is submerged in 
water, it doesn’t appear bent because the stick is actually bent; it appears bent due to the 
way in which light refracts off of the surface of the water and onto the surface of the 
observers’s eyes, where it is then processed as input by  our fallible eyes and brains. 
Accepting this process eliminates the absurd notions that the stick has causal powers or 
that it fundamentally changes in certain circumstances.
 The point is that context could very  well be internalized, similar to our mental 
images of the submerged stick. It is important to note that my mentioning the eye in my 
description of the process by which a mental image is formed has nothing to do with the 
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eye as a means of perceiving the external world (as proposed in the Robot Reply). The 
eye could be replaced with anything that receives input, for example, a person in the 
Chinese Room.
Reply to Searle’s Notion of Intentionality
 To Turing, intentionality  is completely irrelevant and in general, notions about 
theory  of mind are too vague to serve as the foundation for any worthy  argument. Those 
who wish to add anything valuable to the discussion about the nature of intelligence and 
thought should recognize that intentionality is a vague intuition, not a rigorous concept.
 Searle is deeply  anxious about the objective existence of consciousness, so he has 
to try  to find ways to prove that the human mind is more than just a neurologically-
realized machine. The “Chinese Room” is just a way of expressing an irrational belief 
that we are somehow exceptional, and that the universal principles of learning and 
intelligence we have worked out do not apply  to us. Searle does not seem to understand 
that intelligence and consciousness are separable, and from a rigorous perspective, and 
function F that maps R ! R can be considered “intelligent” provided it behaves 
according to some intelligible pattern (i.e. it passes the Turing Test).
 These replies to Searle’s Chinese Room argument are helpful to understand since 
some of them successfully  defend and reinforce the validity of the Turing Test against 
Searle’s claims. But it is important to note that Searle’s argument does not affect the 
discussion of moral status of AI. When a rational actor confronts a machine that is able to 
pass the Turing Test, her moral stance towards that machine must be based on her 
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interaction with it, since we determine our moral stance towards other beings in this way. 
It’s not whether or not an agent can feel pain, we must morally act as if it  did, since we do 
not require an agent to prove that it is genuinely experiencing pain versus merely 
exhibiting behavior intended to “simulate” the experience of pain.
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CHAPTER TWO
I. MORAL STATUS
 In her notable bioethics article titled On the Moral and Legal Status of Abortion, 
Mary Anne Warren suggests that the following traits are “the most central to the concept 
of personhood,”
1. Consciousness (of objects and events external and/or internal to the 
being), and in particular the capacity to feel pain;
2. Reasoning (the developed capacity  to solve new and relatively complex 
problems);
3. Self-motivated activity (activity  which is relatively  independent of either 
genetic or direct external control);
4. The capacity  to communicate, by whatever means, messages of an 
indefinite variety  of types, that is, not just with an indefinite number of 
possible contents, but on indefinitely many possible topics;
5. The presence of self-concepts, and self-awareness, either individual or 
racial, or both.1
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instruct.westvalley.edu/lafave/warren_article.html (accessed November 2, 2010).
Warren admits that formulating such precise definitions, as well as developing universal 
applications, often produces philosophically problematic results, so she tells us to 
consider these five criteria as a loose framework in which sufficiency and necessity are 
left open-ended. For example, in one’s evaluation of whether or not  some alien being is a 
person, one may find that traits (1) and (2) alone are sufficient to assess that being’s 
personhood. However, Warren claims that a being that manifests none of the above traits 
is certainly not a person.2 I believe that this framework for evaluating personhood is clear 
and intuitive, and sets an appropriate stage for discussion of the moral status of AI agents 
that can pass the Turing Test.
 I do not think that it is contentious to say that one’s passing the Turing Test 
provides evidence for one’s manifestation of, or one’s capacity to manifest, traits (3) and 
(4) at the very  least. It seems fairly obvious to say that an AI that passes the Turing Test 
necessarily grasps a wide range of linguistic and conversational concepts at a level of 
sophistication that is comparable to that present in humans, that is, the capacity  to 
communicate. Furthermore, we can assume trait (3) because of the isolated conditions in 
which the Turing Test is conducted. Neither the machine nor the machine’s programmer 
has access to the interrogator's questions beforehand. It also seems intuitive to say  that 
trait (2), likewise, can be assumed, due to the fact that it is required in order for a 
machine to be eligible for test participation in the first place. This refers to Turing’s 
previously-mentioned specification of “digital computers” as the only eligible machine 
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participants in the Turing Test, since they are modeled after and can closely mimic the 
functionality and complexity of “human computers.”3
 We are then left to ponder traits (1) and (5), and whether or not one’s passing the 
Turing Test provides evidence for these traits, or if traits (1) and (5) are even suitable or 
appropriate conditions for evaluating the moral status of human beings, let alone the 
moral status of AI agents. Imagine an AI that makes the claim, “I am conscious.” How 
can that machine prove itself? Would it be any easier for a human to prove herself if she 
were to make that claim? She might say, in her defense, that she has felt pain, she has felt 
joy, she has wondered, etc. But an AI could say these things just as easily, regardless of 
whether it is actually conscious or simply acting like it is. I believe that the only  valid 
response to this is to bite the bullet; we don’t require other humans to prove that  they are 
actually conscious and not merely acting as if they are, so it seems unfair that we demand 
such proof from AI agents in order to award them moral status. Therefore, our social and 
moral assessments depend solely  on appearance, namely, the appearance that one has 
intelligence, the appearance that one is conscious, the appearance that one has emotions, 
etc., rather than demanding reality. Mark Coeckelbergh, Professor of Philosophy of 
Technology at the Philosophy Department of the University  of Twente, The Netherlands, 
explains that in human-to-human interaction:
As a rule, we do not demand proof that the other person has mental states 
or that they are conscious; instead, we interpret the other’s appearance and 
behaviour as an emotion. Moreover, we further interact with them as if 
they  were doing the same with us. The other party  to the interaction has 
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virtual subjectivity or quasi-subjectivity: we tend to interact with them as 
if our appearance and behaviour appeared in their consciousness.4
In accordance with this social norm of human-to-human interaction, it should follow that 
a sufficiently advanced AI -- that is, an AI that can pass the Turing Test, insofar as it can 
(in the very least) “imitate subjectivity  and consciousness in a sufficiently  convincing 
way” -- could also become a member of our moral community and “matter to us in virtue 
of [its appearance].”5
 This phenomenological interpretation of morality (i.e. the appearance of 
consciousness, emotions, and mental states) not only  helps us understand how we will 
likely interact  with, and feel moral obligation towards, future AI agents, but  it also helps 
us make sense of our current notion of human morality. I don’t feel a sense of moral 
obligation towards my toaster, and I would never consider it a member of a moral 
community, simply because it doesn’t appear to be conscious or experiencing joy. It’s 
interesting to note that we hold similar attitudes towards some animals, but not towards 
others. On what basis are we awarding only  certain animals with acceptance into our 
moral community? Certainly, if I were to beat my toaster with a hammer, or even shoot it 
with a shotgun, no one would protest my action on moral grounds. Likewise, if I were to 
harm an ant or a worm, I would also face no moral opposition. Yet why is our society 
morally opposed to canine abuse, for example? I believe that we ascribe moral agency to 
certain animals and not to others because some species give the appearance of having 
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mental states and emotions while others do not. As Coeckelbergh points out, “we treat a 
particular dog as a pet since it  appears to have those emotions that make us see it as a 
companion.”6
 It is clear that the manifestation of consciousness and emotions is not required, 
and that  the mere appearance of such is sufficient to draw a subject into our moral 
community, based on our notion of human morality. It is somewhat unsatisfying, 
however, to think that our concepts of moral obligation and responsibility are based 
purely  on superficial principles. I will therefore attempt to reduce this property (one’s 
ability  to appear to be conscious or have emotions, or one’s ability  to appear to manifest 
Warren’s traits (1) and (5)) to be merely a consequence of one’s manifesting traits (2), (3), 
and (4), namely, one’s intelligence.
 Engineers and designers of AI agents, therefore, do not bear the burden of 
creating consciousness or emotions in their machines. If they aim to design a robot with 
traits (2), (3), and (4), it’s quite plausible that the robot will learn to produce the 
appearance of having consciousness, emotions, and self-awareness in relation to its 
environment and other entities occupying that environment.
II. BRAITENBERG’S VEHICLES
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 This idea of evolutive behavior in machines was most famously illustrated by 
Valentino Braitenberg in his revolutionary book, Vehicles: Experiments in Synthetic 
Psychology. The vehicles he discusses are extremely  simplistic in their programming and 
design. Each vehicle just has a set of sensors connected to its motor, similar to a living 
creature’s neurological connections to its eyes or ears. With these sensors, the vehicle can 
interact with its environment and exhibit increasingly complex behaviors as a result of its 
sensor-actuator connections. Eventually, the vehicle appears to be capable of expressing 
fear, aggression, love, etc.7
 Braitenberg’s vehicles are rudimentary implementations of AI. They have 
intelligence but lack cognition, yet they can adapt to shifting environmental conditions. 
Their behavior, which results from mere light detection, is undeniably  goal-oriented. The 
vehicles appear to have the same level of intelligence as cockroaches, but they do not 
undergo any cognitive processes, and they are instantiated programmatically.
 The fact that intelligent-type behavior develops naturally  (i.e. without being 
explicitly programmed) in Braitenberg’s vehicles is not only intriguing, but also 
promising in terms of feasibility of advancements in AI.
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CONCLUSION
 The ability  to communicate effectively with humans is by  far the biggest obstacle 
for AI engineers and designers who seek to build non-human citizens. Linguistic nuances, 
such as slang terms and idioms, typically  confuse AI systems. On the other hand, current 
AI systems compute and strategize faster and more accurately than we ever could. Future 
projects in this field will undeniably have a huge impact on our lives. Perhaps robots will 
fight our wars, take our jobs, save our lives, etc. They might even become the 
Hummingbird Hawk-moths to the human species.1
 As rational actors, we must  base our moral stance towards AI agents solely on our 
interactions with them. Therefore, machines that can pass the Turing Test will likely join 
our moral community to some degree. We will have no reason to treat them differently 
than other beings that exhibit human-type intelligence. Questions regarding the moral 
responsibility of these agents will be no more answerable or unanswerable than questions 
regarding the moral responsibility of humans.
30
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byproduct of convergent evolution.
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